Inflation targeting is a framework in which a central bank names a numerical goal for inflation and publishes a strategy for how it intends to reach that goal. The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank each run some version of this, and each has settled on roughly the same number: 2 percent. This page walks through what a target actually is, why so many central banks picked 2 percent rather than zero, how the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB each state their goal, which country targeted first, and how a target is supposed to work through interest rates and expectations. It is educational only and is not investment, financial, tax or legal advice, and nothing here is a forecast of future Fed, Bank of England or ECB decisions.
What an inflation target actually is
An inflation target has two parts. The first is a number: a rate of inflation the central bank judges consistent with price stability. The second is a public strategy explaining how the bank intends to get there and how it will be held accountable. The Federal Reserve bundles both parts into one document, the Statement on Longer Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, whose title names the goal and the strategy together. The Bank of England's page on inflation and the 2% target frames the same idea as a target the Government sets for the Bank, with the Bank then explaining each month how it is doing. Publishing the number and the reasoning is the point: a target that nobody can check is not much of an anchor for expectations.
Why 2 percent and not zero
If price stability is the goal, a reader might expect the target to be zero. Most inflation targeting central banks pick a small positive number instead, and the reasoning is fairly consistent across sources. A 2019 explainer from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, drawing on comments from St. Louis Fed economist David Wheelock, gives three reasons.
- Measurement bias. Price indexes do not perfectly track the cost of living, and the St. Louis Fed piece says they carry a slight upward bias, so a measured rate of 1 or 2 percent may in fact be closer to true price stability than a reading of zero would suggest.
- Room above the lower bound. A higher average inflation rate tends to go with higher nominal interest rates. That gives the central bank more room to cut its policy rate in a downturn before running into the floor on nominal rates, often called the zero lower bound or effective lower bound. See the liquidity trap and the zero lower bound explainer for what happens once a central bank runs out of that room.
- Deflation risk. The same piece reports that the costs of a bout of deflation of a given size are generally judged worse than the costs of positive inflation of the same size, so a bank aiming for price stability prefers to keep a buffer above zero rather than risk tipping into falling prices.
The European Central Bank reaches a similar place from its own side. Paragraph 4 of the ECB's 2021 monetary policy strategy statement says that an inflation buffer above zero gives monetary policy space for rate cuts and a safety margin against deflation risk, and names the facilitation of cross country adjustment inside the euro area, downward nominal wage rigidities and measurement bias as further reasons for keeping that buffer. Two different institutions, reasoning from their own mandates, land on overlapping arguments for a small positive number rather than zero.
The Fed's 2 percent PCE goal
The Federal Reserve states its goal in the Statement on Longer Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy. The copy of that statement on the Fed's site today is headed "Adopted effective January 24, 2012; as reaffirmed effective January 27, 2026" and says the Committee "reaffirms its judgment that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory maximum employment and price stability mandates." A separate Fed FAQ on the 2 percent goal, last updated August 22, 2025, explains that when households and businesses can expect inflation to stay low and stable, they can make sounder decisions about saving, borrowing and investment.
The wording has not stayed identical over the years. The version of the statement amended effective August 27, 2020 added language committing the Committee to "achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time" and said that, after periods when inflation ran persistently below 2 percent, policy would likely aim for inflation "moderately above 2 percent for some time." That averaging language, often called flexible average inflation targeting, does not appear in the statement text on the Fed's site today. The current text instead returns to stating the 2 percent PCE goal directly, without the explicit averaging commitment. The Fed's own guide to changes in the statement explains that the FOMC undertook a second periodic framework review in 2025, informed by Fed Listens events, a research conference and FOMC discussion at five consecutive meetings from January 2025, and released a revised statement on August 22, 2025. That same guide page says plainly that "the Committee's 2 percent longer run inflation goal was not a focus of the review," so the number itself was not up for debate even as the surrounding strategy language changed.
Bank of England: 2 percent CPI and the open letter rule
In the United Kingdom, the Government sets the inflation target and the Bank of England is responsible for hitting it. The Bank's page on inflation and the 2% target says the target is 2 percent, measured on the Consumer Prices Index built from around 180,000 prices collected each month across roughly 700 items. The target is not a ceiling the Bank must never cross. The same page explains the accountability rule attached to it: if CPI inflation moves more than 1 percentage point away from 2 percent in either direction, so above 3 percent or below 1 percent, the Governor must write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining why and setting out what the Bank will do to bring inflation back toward target. When this page was checked on 16 November 2026, that Bank of England page showed the current CPI inflation rate at 3.5 percent against the 2 percent target, a gap of 1.5 percentage points. That figure is simply what the page reported on the day it was opened for this article, not a forecast of where UK inflation is headed next.
ECB: a symmetric 2 percent medium term target
The European Central Bank's current framework dates to its 2021 strategy review. According to the ECB's 8 July 2021 press release announcing the new strategy, the Governing Council adopted a 2 percent inflation target over the medium term and described the commitment to that target as symmetric, meaning the Governing Council treats inflation running persistently below target as being just as undesirable as inflation running persistently above it. The ECB's own monetary policy strategy page repeats that framing today: price stability is best maintained by aiming for 2 percent inflation over the medium term, measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, with the symmetric commitment meaning negative and positive deviations from the target are equally undesirable. The medium term part of that phrase matters. It is a deliberate choice to allow short run deviations from 2 percent rather than demanding the rate sit exactly at target every month.
New Zealand: the first formal inflation targeter
Before the Fed, the Bank of England or the ECB framed their goals this way, New Zealand got there first. A speech hosted by the Bank for International Settlements says the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act came into force in February 1990, "making New Zealand the first country to formally adopt inflation targeting as we now know it." A separate BIS hosted speech by then Governor Graeme Wheeler fills in the sequence: once the Act took effect, "a month later, the Minister of Finance and the Governor signed the first Policy Targets Agreement, which specified an annual inflation target of 0 to 2 percent." Wheeler's speech says this reform gave the Reserve Bank the explicit goal of maintaining inflation in a range consistent with price stability, operational independence to pursue that goal, and accountability, through its Governor, for reaching it. That three part design, an explicit numerical goal, independence to pursue it and accountability for the outcome, is the same basic template the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB each use today, even though each institution states its own number and strategy in its own words.
How a target is supposed to work
An inflation target only matters if it changes behaviour. Three channels do most of the work.
- Interest rates. When inflation runs persistently above target, a central bank with an inflation target can raise its policy rate to cool spending, as the monetary and fiscal policy pillar on this site describes. The Taylor rule is a classroom way to connect that inflation gap, alongside a measure of economic slack, to a suggested policy rate; try the Taylor rule calculator to see the arithmetic.
- Expectations. A credible target shapes what households and firms build into wage demands and pricing decisions. The Fed's own FAQ on the 2 percent goal makes this point directly: when inflation is expected to stay low and stable, saving, borrowing and investment decisions improve.
- Forward guidance. Central banks also communicate about the likely future path of policy, which can move longer term borrowing costs today even before any rate change takes effect. The forward guidance explainer on this site covers the open ended, calendar and threshold based types central banks have actually used, and the liquidity trap explainer covers forward guidance as one of the tools used when the policy rate itself is stuck near its floor.
Headline, core, and which gauge is measured
Which price index counts as "the" inflation rate differs by country. The Fed's target is on the PCE price index, while the Bank of England's target is on CPI and the ECB's is on the HICP. All three allow for a core or underlying reading alongside the headline figure that is actually targeted. The headline versus core inflation explainer and the CPI versus PCE explainer on this site go into that split in more detail, including why the Fed watches both PCE and CPI even though PCE is the index named in its longer run goal.
A hypothetical worked example
The numbers here are made up for teaching. Suppose a central bank has a 2 percent inflation target and its policy rate is currently 5 percent nominal. If inflation is running at the 2 percent target, the real policy rate, roughly the nominal rate minus inflation, is 5 minus 2, or 3 percent. Now suppose inflation instead runs at 4 percent against the same 2 percent target, with the nominal policy rate still at 5 percent. The real policy rate falls to 5 minus 4, or 1 percent. Nothing about the nominal rate changed, but policy has become looser in real terms simply because inflation rose above target. If the public also starts to expect that 4 percent inflation will persist rather than fall back toward 2 percent, that higher expected inflation can feed into wage and pricing decisions, which is exactly the anchoring problem an inflation target is meant to prevent. A central bank that wants to hold the real rate steady, or push it higher to cool an inflation overrun, would need to raise the nominal policy rate by more than the rise in inflation. See the real interest rates explainer and the real interest rate calculator for the arithmetic behind this example.
Common exam mistakes
- Treating the target as a ceiling. A symmetric target, as the ECB's statement explicitly says, treats inflation below target as equally undesirable as inflation above it. It is not a maximum the central bank is only trying to avoid breaching from above.
- Assuming the target must be hit every single month. The ECB frames its commitment as a medium term goal that allows for short run deviations. The Bank of England's own accountability rule only triggers a letter once CPI is more than a full percentage point away from 2 percent, not at the first sign of any deviation.
- Mixing up which price index is targeted. The Fed targets PCE inflation, not CPI; the Bank of England targets CPI; the ECB targets the HICP. Quoting the wrong gauge against the wrong target is an easy error.
- Assuming zero inflation is the ideal outcome. As the reasons above show, central banks deliberately avoid a zero target because of measurement bias, the room a small positive rate gives for rate cuts, and the risk of deflation.
- Forgetting the real rate when inflation moves away from target. As the worked example shows, a fixed nominal policy rate becomes looser in real terms when inflation rises above target, and tighter in real terms when inflation falls below it.
Related reading
- Headline versus core inflation and CPI versus PCE, the two ways of reading the gauge a target is measured against
- The federal funds rate, the Taylor rule and the Taylor rule calculator, for how a rate gets set around an inflation goal
- The Phillips curve, real interest rates and the real interest rate calculator
- Forward guidance, the liquidity trap and the zero lower bound, deflation versus disinflation and the neutral rate of interest (r star)
- Quantitative easing and stagflation, for what happens to a target when the usual tools are strained
- The inflation adjuster, the inflation pillar, the monetary and fiscal policy pillar, the AP Macroeconomics study hub and the explainers index
Sources
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Why does the Federal Reserve aim for inflation of 2 percent over the longer run? (last updated August 22, 2025; retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- Federal Open Market Committee, Statement on Longer Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, adopted effective January 24, 2012, as reaffirmed effective January 27, 2026 (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- Federal Open Market Committee, Statement on Longer Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, as amended effective August 27, 2020 (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Review of Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communications (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- Kristie M. Engemann, The Fed's Inflation Target: Why 2 Percent?, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Open Vault blog, 16 Jan 2019 (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- Bank of England, Inflation and the 2% target (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- European Central Bank, Monetary policy strategy (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- European Central Bank, ECB's Governing Council approves its new monetary policy strategy, press release, 8 July 2021 (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- European Central Bank, The ECB's monetary policy strategy statement (2021) (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- Reserve Bank of New Zealand speech, Inflation targeting in New Zealand, an experience in evolution, hosted by the Bank for International Settlements, 17 Apr 2018 (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
- Graeme Wheeler, Reflections on 25 years of inflation targeting, Reserve Bank of New Zealand speech hosted by the Bank for International Settlements, 1 Dec 2014 (retrieved 16 Nov 2026)
Frequently asked questions
What is an inflation target in plain terms?
An inflation target is a numerical goal for the rate of inflation, paired with a public strategy that explains how the central bank intends to reach it. The Federal Reserve publishes its goal and strategy together in a single document, the Statement on Longer Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, which states that 2 percent inflation in the personal consumption expenditures price index is most consistent with its mandate. The Bank of England and the European Central Bank publish similar public commitments to a 2 percent goal.
Why do central banks target 2 percent instead of zero?
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis gives three common reasons. First, price indexes have a slight upward measurement bias, so a measured rate of 1 or 2 percent may be closer to true price stability than zero. Second, a positive inflation rate tends to go with higher nominal interest rates, which gives the central bank more room to cut rates in a downturn before hitting the zero or effective lower bound. Third, the costs of a bout of deflation are generally judged worse than the costs of the same size move in positive inflation, so policymakers prefer to err on the positive side. The European Central Bank's own 2021 strategy statement lists measurement bias and the effective lower bound among the reasons for keeping an inflation buffer above zero.
What is the Federal Reserve's inflation target?
The Federal Reserve's longer run goal, first adopted effective January 24, 2012 and reaffirmed effective January 27, 2026, is 2 percent inflation as measured by the annual change in the personal consumption expenditures price index. The FOMC revised the statement on August 22, 2025 after a periodic review of its strategy, tools, and communications; the Fed's own review overview page says the 2 percent longer run goal itself was not a focus of that review.
What happens if UK inflation moves away from the Bank of England's target?
The Bank of England's target, set by the Government, is 2 percent on the Consumer Prices Index. If CPI inflation is more than 1 percentage point away from 2 percent in either direction, the Bank's page on inflation and the target says the Governor must write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining why and setting out what the Bank will do to bring inflation back to target.
Which country adopted inflation targeting first?
New Zealand. A Bank for International Settlements hosted speech by then Reserve Bank of New Zealand Governor Graeme Wheeler says the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act came into force in 1990 and that, a month later, the Minister of Finance and the Governor signed the first Policy Targets Agreement, specifying an annual inflation target of 0 to 2 percent, which made New Zealand the first country to formally adopt inflation targeting as its monetary policy regime.